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Abstract
Using data for 162 countries for the period 1962-2006, this paper examines the importance of
the national economic growth rate for the ability of a national leader to retain his or her position.
To address the potential endogeneity of economic growth, I use commodity prices, export partner
incomes, precipitation, and temperature to instrument for a country’s growth rate. The results in-
dicate that faster economic growth increases the short-run likelihood that leaders will remain in
office. The results are robust to controlling for a host of leader-, party-, and country-level vari-
ables. The effect of growth on the likelihood of leader exits appears to be generally similar across
both democracies and autocracies. Economic growth has the largest impact on the likelihood of
regular leader exits rather than irregular exits such as coups. Evidence is also presented on whether
economic growth affects the likelihood that leaders employ oppressive tactics against opponents.
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 1. Introduction 
Does a strong economy increase the likelihood that national leaders will remain in 
office? The impact of the state of the economy on political survival is a question 
of fundamental importance in political economy, but one for which existing 
evidence is incomplete. Prior studies generally identify a positive relationship 
between economic growth and the electoral success of incumbents in democracies 
(see, for example, Palmer and Whitten 1999, Wolfers 2002, Leigh 2009). But 
many leaders lose their jobs outside of elections, and many countries do not have 
free and fair elections. Few studies examine the broad relationship between 
economic growth and political survival in both democracies and autocracies. In 
addition, prior studies on the effect of the economy on political outcomes 
generally ignore the potential endogeneity of economic growth.  
The November 2011 resignations of the Prime Ministers of Greece and 
Italy are a reminder that times of falling growth are often times of leadership 
change. There are also notable instances of autocratic leaders being undermined 
by deteriorating economies: President Suharto of Indonesia, for instance, resigned 
during the economic turmoil of the Asian financial crisis of 1998. Despite these 
examples, the impact of a weakening economy on the underlying probability that 
national leaders will lose their jobs is not clear. 
Leadership matters. National leaders have a significant influence over 
economic, social, and political developments in their countries, and commonly 
attempt to distinguish themselves from their predecessors (Jones and Olken 2005, 
2009). Exits of national leaders are often associated with moments of substantive 
political change. Whether the rate of economic growth systematically affects the 
abilities of leaders to succeed in their positions is of considerable consequence, 
and of interest to policy makers, domestic participants in the political process, 
outsiders who wish to encourage or discourage leadership transitions, and others. 
Whether economic growth has differing implications for democratic leaders and 
autocratic leaders, and whether certain modes of leader exit are more dependent 
on the state of the economy, are also of relevance in informing both policy and 
theory. 
This paper adopts an instrumental variable (IV) approach to identify the 
causal impact of economic growth on changes in the primary national leader. Four 
instruments for economic growth are employed: commodity export price 
movements, export partner growth rates, precipitation, and temperature. 
Estimations are carried out for a large country-level panel data set, and control for 
a host of variables that may affect leader exits, as well as country and year fixed 
effects. The results indicate that faster economic growth significantly improves 
the short-run political survival prospects of national leaders. Of particular interest 
is that the estimated effect of economic growth on political survival extends to 
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 autocratic leaders. As far as I am aware, this is the first study to provide robust 
evidence of a broad causal impact of economic growth on national leader political 
survival. The paper also examines whether the state of the economy affects the 
likelihood of purges of those opposing the leader. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
theory and existing evidence on economic growth and leadership change. Sections 
3 and 4 outline the empirical approach and discuss the data used in the study. 
Estimation results are presented in Section 5. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Economic growth and short-term political survival prospects 
There are a number of reasons why the political survival prospects of a national 
leader may be improved by a stronger economy – even if the stronger economy is 
the result of factors outside the leader’s control (such as improvements in 
economic conditions in export markets). Ex ante, these reasons may apply to both 
democratic leaders and autocratic leaders. First, members of the selectorate (those 
with an influence over the choice of national leader, including voters, cabinet 
members, the military, and others) may use the economic growth rate as a proxy 
for leader competence and be more likely to support the incumbent leader if the 
economy is growing quickly. They might be particularly likely to do so if they 
have limited information on the workings of the economy and/or the incumbent 
leader’s performance (Alesina et al. 1997). Second, a stronger economy may 
make it easier for an incumbent leader to pursue their political agenda, provide 
goods and services to the public, meet their political promises, maintain or build 
patronage networks, and buy-off real and potential opposition. Further, a stronger 
economy may lead to an improvement in the national government’s fiscal balance, 
which is often electorally popular (Brender and Drazen 2008). By increasing the 
opportunity cost of time, a rapidly growing economy may also reduce the ability 
of political opponents to drum up support for their cause. Conversely, an 
economic slowdown that reduces the opportunity cost of time (by increasing the 
numbers of the unemployed, for instance) may make it easier for opponents to 
organize political resistance. 
Counter-arguments exist. Olson (1963) and Huntington (1968, 1991) hold 
that stronger economic growth could increase inequality and strain the social 
fabric, potentially leading to political instability. Economic slowdowns may also 
favor the experience of the incumbent leader and see calls for political stability in 
the face of economic uncertainty. Or perhaps there is no systematic relationship 
between economic growth and leadership change. If members of the selectorate 
believe that national leaders have little impact on aggregate economic growth or if 
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 they are able to directly judge the leader’s performance, their support for the 
leader may be unrelated to the national economic growth rate. 
Complicating the situation from an estimation point of view, there is 
evidence that political factors affect the economy, meaning that the direction of 
causality is unlikely to be one-way. Barro (1991), Alesina et al. (1996), Brunetti 
(1997), and Przeworski et al. (2000), for instance, find that political instability is 
harmful to the economy. Political instability may entail protests, uncertainty, and 
low investment, which are likely to hurt the economic growth rate. There is also 
evidence that leaders attempt to influence the economy with the aim of improving 
their electoral prospects (see Drazen 2000 on the political business cycle). 
National leaders with falling popularity may seek to artificially stimulate the 
economy through government spending, for example. 
Further still, other variables may affect both political survival and the state 
of the economy. One such variable is leader competence: leaders can affect the 
health of the economy (Jones and Olken 2005), and voters, cabinet, and others are 
likely to reward competent leadership. Other variables affecting both political 
survival and the state of the economy may include institutions, regime type, 
government policies, global events such as the end of the Cold War, and 
expectations concerning political stability.  
Existing evidence generally suggests that faster economic growth 
improves political survival prospects, although most prior studies have not had a 
strong focus on identifying a causal effect. As discussed, many papers have 
concluded that incumbents are more likely to win elections if the economy is 
strong. Studies such as those of Londregan et al. (1995), Londregan and Poole 
(1996), Carmignani (2002), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Marinov (2005), 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), and Malone (2011) report a positive 
relationship between economic growth and political survival more generally. 
Lindenberg (1990) and Remmer (1991) find that economic slowdowns undermine 
incumbent leaders in Central America. Li and Zhou (2005) conclude that 
economic growth is also important for the short-term job security of Chinese 
provincial leaders. Londregan and Poole (1990) present evidence that lower 
incomes facilitate coups, although find no evidence that the economic growth rate 
affects the short-run likelihood of coups. Bienen and van de Walle (1991, 1992) 
find no evidence for a global sample that a country’s average economic growth 
rate increases leadership duration, but do not look at whether the annual rate of 
economic growth affects short-term political survival. Besley and Kudamatsu 
(2008) identify leadership turnover as a characteristic of successful autocracies, 
yet there is little evidence on whether the state of the economy is important to the 
timing of the political exits of autocrats. 
 Only a limited number of studies have adopted estimation techniques that 
address the potential endogeneity of economic growth. Alesina et al. (1996) use a 
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 simultaneous equation specification to model the relationship between economic 
growth and changes in national leaders. They find evidence that a weak economy 
increases the likelihood of coups but no statistically significant evidence that the 
economic growth rate affects other types of leadership change. But their practice 
of instrumenting economic growth with education is not convincing: education is 
slow moving, and may not be exogenous to political change. Deaton and Miller 
(1995) use a commodity price index to instrument for economic growth in sub-
Saharan African countries, and find a negative but statistically insignificant effect 
of economic growth on political exits. Wolfers (2002) investigates whether 
gubernatorial election results in the United States are affected by shocks to state 
economies from the national economy and from oil prices, and finds that positive 
economic shocks increase the likelihood of incumbent re-election. Brender and 
Drazen (2008) and Leigh (2009) examine the impact of changes in world 
economic activity on the results of national elections. Only the latter of these two 
studies finds that a faster-growing global economy aids national leader re-election 
prospects. In reduced-form estimations, Dell et al. (2008) find that temperature 
increases raise the likelihood of coups in poor countries, but find no significant 
effect of temperature on other types of leader exits. 
In a related literature, Burke and Leigh (2010) use several IV approaches 
to investigate the impact of economic growth on the short-term likelihood of 
institutional change. They find evidence that adverse economic shocks from the 
weather trigger democratic change but no evidence that such shocks affect the 
likelihood of democratic reversals, and also no evidence that shocks to the 
economy from commodity export prices affect the likelihoods of either 
democratic progress or democratic reversals.1 The empirical approach adopted in 
this paper extends on that of Burke and Leigh.2  
 
3. Empirical approach 
3.1 Estimation model 
The model for estimation is: 
 
  , , 1 , ,c t c t c t j c t c tD G I Iα ε− −′= + + + +x β     (1) 
 
                                                 
1 Caselli and Tesei (2011) and Brückner et al. (forthcoming) present additional evidence on the 
effect of commodity price fluctuations on institutional development. 
2 In working papers that appeared subsequent to the initial version of this paper, Cáceres and 
Malone (2011) and Treisman (2011) also present IV evidence on the relationship between 
economic growth and leader exits. Their IV approaches are narrower than that employed here. 
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 where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if there is an exit of the effective 
primary national leader during year t (excluding exits due to natural death or 
deposition by another state), and 0 otherwise. This dependent variable covers exits 
of leaders brought about by election loss, resignation, loss of cabinet support, loss 
of the support of the legislature, sickness, coup, popular revolt, assassination, 
domestic armed rebellion, and other means. , 1c tG −  is the real gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita growth rate in year t-1.3 ,c t j−′x  is a vector of time-
varying control variables, Ic is a vector of country fixed effects, tI  is a vector of 
year fixed effects, and ,εc t  is an error term, with ,( ) 0ε =c tE .  
Equation 1 is initially estimated using a linear probability model (LPM), a 
logit model, and a Cox (1972) proportional hazard model. A probit model is not 
employed because it is not suited to a fixed effects treatment (Greene 2000). The 
inclusion of country fixed effects is important because unobserved time-invariant 
factors, such as difficult-to-measure characteristics of the electoral system, may 
affect both political stability and economic growth. Results are presented both 
with and without the time-varying controls. These time-varying controls include 
log GDP per capita, the secondary school enrollment rate, the percentage of 
people aged 65 years and above, the tenure of the leader in power at the start of 
year t in years, the age of the leader in power at the start of year t, a dummy equal 
to 1 for the years 1989-1992 for countries classed as transition economies by the 
Development Research Institute (DRI 2009) and 0 otherwise, a dummy for 
countries that are classed as democracies at the end of year t-1, dummies for 
elections that affect the effective primary national leader, and a dummy for the 
year of a legal term limit.4 The first three of these controls are measured at t-2 so 
that they are not affected by year t-1 growth. Additional controls, such as party 
dummies, are included in robustness checks. Estimated standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country level to account for possible 
serial correlation. 
 
                                                 
3 Specifications including GDP per capita growth in years t-2, t, and t+1 are also explored. Using 
growth in year t-1 has the advantage of ensuring examination of a temporally-prior effect (year-t 
growth covers calendar months subsequent to many year-t leader exits). 
4  The inclusion of log GDP per capitat-2 in the regressions raises the issue of the potential 
endogeneity of t-2 GDP, but has little impact on the estimated coefficient for the explanatory 
variable of primary interest, GDP per capita growtht-1. I control for elections in years t and t-1 as in 
some instances leaders leave office in the calendar year after elections are held. The timing of 
elections in some countries is affected by the national leader and/or legislature and so may be 
endogenous, but the inclusion of the election dummies does not substantially affect estimated 
coefficients on GDP per capita growtht-1.  
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 3.2 Instrumenting for economic growth 
Despite the lagging of growth, it is possible that it is endogenous to the system. 
Times of political instability may be harmful for growth, as they may be 
characterized by uncertainty, the mobilization of protestors, low investment, and 
reduced tourism. Expectations of political change may also harm growth, and the 
competence of incumbent leaders and challengers may affect both current 
economic growth and the likelihood of leader change. The policies and actions of 
the incumbent government (and others) may also affect both the economy and the 
likelihood of the national leader remaining in office. Given the infeasibility of 
controlling for unobservable factors such as anticipation of upcoming leader 
change, leader competence, and all relevant policies, an IV approach is required to 
obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of economic growth on political 
survival, and to ensure that estimates represent causal impacts, rather than simply 
correlation. An IV approach also allows potential attenuation bias arising from 
measurement error in national accounts data, for which there is substantial 
evidence (Heston 1994), to be addressed.  
Four strategies to instrument for economic growth are employed. The 
strategies involve using sources of variation in economic growth resulting from 
the international economy or the weather which are unlikely to be affected by 
political developments in any individual country. I am unaware of any other 
instruments for economic growth of relevance to this paper that have been used 
elsewhere in the literature.5  
The first IV strategy is to instrument for economic growth using changes 
in commodity export prices following Burke and Leigh (2010). I employ a 
commodity export price index constructed using country-specific commodity 
weights based on the share of each commodity in a country’s (50-commodity) 
commodity export bundle in 1995.6 These weights are held fixed over time and 
applied to deflated world price indices to produce a country-specific 
arithmetically weighted index of world commodity prices. The differenced log of 
the index is multiplied by the share of exports of the 50 commodities in GDP in 
1995 to allow the effect of commodity price fluctuations on economic growth to 
be larger for countries that are more dependent on commodity exports, which 
substantially improves the strength of the instrument. The most important 
commodities in the index in value terms are oil, fish, natural gas, and coal.  
                                                 
5 The terms of trade has been used to instrument for five-yearly changes in income (see e.g. 
Pritchett and Summers 1996). Terms of trade data are unavailable for the majority of country-
years in the estimation sample. 
6 Using fixed weights ensures that the within-country variation of the instrument only reflects 
year-to-year changes in global commodity prices and is not affected by (potentially endogenous) 
reorientations of export quantities. A similar point applies to the export partner growth instrument. 
1995 weights allow broad country coverage. 
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 The second IV strategy is to instrument for growth using a weighted 
export partner growth rate. This strategy follows evidence that economic growth 
is strongly affected by export partner growth, even in estimations that control for 
distance-weighted and world GDP growth rates (Arora and Vamvakidis 2005). 
Weights are based on the share of each export market in a country’s total exports 
in 1995, using data from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics. The weighted export partner growth rate is multiplied by the share of 
exports in GDP in 1995 to allow export partner growth to be of greater importance 
to economic growth in relatively more export-oriented economies. Related IV 
approaches have been used in different contexts by Acemoglu et al. (2008) and 
Brückner and Ciccone (2010). 
The third IV strategy is to instrument for GDP growth using precipitation. 
I use log precipitation, employing country-level data from Dell et al. (2008) and, 
for five small countries, Mitchell et al. (2004). Log precipitation has the 
advantage of providing stronger first-stage identification than the year-to-year 
proportional change in precipitation (as used by Miguel et al. 2004 and Burke and 
Leigh 2010). It is also appropriate to use precipitation levels rather than growth 
rates due to the mean-reverting nature of annual precipitation (see Brückner and 
Ciccone 2011 and Ciccone 2011).7 
The fourth IV strategy is to instrument for economic growth using 
temperature. Dell et al. (2008) and Burke and Leigh (2010) show that temperature 
variation is strongly correlated with economic growth at the country level. I 
instrument for economic growth using (1) temperature and (2) temperature 
interacted with a dummy for countries with an average temperature for the period 
1960-1970 of less than 12ºC (to allow the impact of temperature on economic 
growth to differ for cold countries).8 Temperature data are country averages from 
Dell et al. (2008) and Mitchell et al. (2004). 
The use of the four IV strategies is appealing because the instruments 
provide different sources of plausibly exogenous variation in economic growth, 
allowing the estimation of different local average treatment effects (LATEs). 
Commodity export prices and the pace of growth in the economies of export 
partners are demand-side factors that are of primary relevance for export-oriented 
sectors, whereas precipitation and temperature are supply-side factors likely to be 
most strongly correlated with growth in agricultural output. 9  The weather 
                                                 
7 Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root tests (Im et al. 2003) suggest that temperature and precipitation are 
stationary series. GDP per capita growth is also a stationary series. Annual growth rates are used 
for the commodity price and export partner GDP instruments because commodity prices and 
export partner GDP are unit root processes.  
8 Results are similar if different “cold country” temperature cut-offs are used. 
9  Precipitation is also important for other water-intensive activities, such as hydroelectricity 
generation. There is also evidence that higher temperatures reduce labor productivity and 
industrial output (Dell et al. 2008, Hsiang 2010). 
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 instruments reflect transitory shocks, whereas commodity prices and export 
partner GDP do not display rapid mean reversion.  
The instruments are not without limitation. The weather instruments are 
fairly weak for the global sample, and so results are also presented for sub-
samples of economies which are likely to be more weather-dependent (e.g. 
agricultural countries). World commodity prices and export partner incomes may 
also not always be exogenous, as they might in some instances be affected by in-
country political developments, particularly in countries that are important 
commodity exporters or have large economies. Nevertheless, similar results are 
obtained in estimations that exclude large commodity producers or large 
economies, as will be discussed.  
The exclusion restriction is that the instruments are orthogonal to the error 
term in equation 1, so that they are only correlated with leader exits via their 
impact on economic growth. One can imagine ways in which this assumption 
might be violated. For example, the weather may directly affect political rallies, or 
commodity prices may have a direct effect in the political sphere beyond any 
effect via output. Although the data suggest that the instruments operate via the 
growth channel in a quantitatively important manner, they do not allow the 
possibility that the instruments operate via other channels to be dismissed.10 If the 
instruments do not in fact satisfy the exclusion restriction, the results nonetheless 
suggest a strong impact of commodity prices and export partner growth rates on 
the timing of leader exits.  
 
4. Data 
Effective primary national leader data are sourced from the Archigos dataset 
(Goemans et al. 2009). I have used Rulers.org (2011) to extend the Archigos data 
to cover years 2005 and 2006. GDP data are from the World Bank (2011a). The 
secondary school enrollment series is constructed using World Bank (2011b) and 
DRI (2009) data. The Dell et al. (2008) precipitation and temperature data are 
country averages constructed by weighting Matsuura and Willmott (2007) gridded 
weather data by the location of the population within each country. These data are 
not available for five small countries (Bahrain, Barbados, Singapore, Maldives, 
Malta), for which I have employed precipitation and temperature data from 
                                                 
10 One way to investigate the direct impact of the instruments on protests is to estimate the 
reduced-form relationship between the instruments and anti-government protests, as measured by 
Databanks International (2008). There is some evidence that additional precipitation reduces the 
likelihood of protests in the next year. Nevertheless, tests of the impact of the set of instruments on 
the likelihood of protests in either the same or the next year fail to find statistically significant 
evidence of a joint effect.  
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 Mitchell et al. (2004). A list of data sources and variable definitions is provided in 
the Appendix. 
The estimation sample consists of 5,496 observations for 45 years (1962-
2006) and 162 countries. Saudi Arabia is excluded from the sample given that it 
has a large influence over the price of oil (the most important commodity covered 
by the commodity price instrument). There is at least one leader exit (excluding 
natural deaths and foreign depositions of leaders) in 891 of the country-years 
(16%). Leader changes are more common in democracies (which have a mean of 
three leader changes each decade) than autocracies (one change per decade). 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
  Mean (Standard 
deviation) 
GDP per capita growtht-1 (% per annum) 2.05 (6.01) 
GDP per capitat-2 (2000 US$ '000) 5.20 (7.83) 
Secondary enrollment ratet-2 (% gross) 49.92 (33.26) 
Population aged 65 years and abovet-2 (%) 6.08 (4.16) 
Tenure of leader in power at start of yeart (years) 7.37 (7.74) 
Age of leader in power at start of yeart (years) 57.02 (11.02) 
Transition dummyt 0.00 (0.06) 
Democracy dummyt-1 0.46 (0.50) 
Election dummyt 0.19 (0.39) 
Term limit dummyt 0.03 (0.18) 
Purge dummyt 0.05 (0.21) 
Commodity price instrumentt-1 0.06 (2.72) 
Export partner growth instrumentt-1  126.88 (115.78) 
Precipitation (ln mm)t-1 6.83 (0.76) 
Temperaturet-1 (ºC) 19.18 (7.28) 
  Sum   
Years of at least one leader exit 891  
Countries 162  
Observations 5,496   
Data on major government crises and purges are available for 5,415 observations in the dataset.
 
A negative association between economic growth and political exits is 
evident in Figure 1, which plots the average GDP per capita growth rate for 
countries in the estimation sample for the years adjacent to leader changes. A 
reduction in GDP per capita growth commencing in the year prior to leader 
changes can be seen: times of political change tend to be times of slow growth. 
This may be because a slowing economy harms the political survival prospects of 
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 national leaders; and/or because leader change harms the economy; and/or 
because of the effect of other factors on both the economy and political survival. 
An IV approach is required to obtain a consistent estimate of the causal impact of 
economic growth on political survival. 
 
Figure 1. GDP growth at times of leader change 
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Goemans et al. (2009) and World Bank (2011a) data. Five years of lagged data are not available 
for all leader changes in the estimation sample. The “full sample average” is for all country-years 
in the sample, and is independent of the x-axis. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Linear probability, logit, and hazard model results 
LPM results are presented in columns 1-2 of Table 2. The results indicate that 
GDP per capita growth has a negative impact on the likelihood of leader exits. 
The estimated impact of growth on the likelihood of leader exits is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in a linear estimation including year and country fixed 
effects (column 1), and at the 5% level once the set of leader and country 
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 characteristics are controlled for (column 2). The estimate in column 2 indicates 
that a one percentage point increase in GDP per capita growth on average reduces 
the likelihood of a national leader exit in the next year by 0.2 percentage points, 
equal to a 1.1% reduction in the average likelihood of leader change.  
 
Table 2. LPM, logit, and hazard model estimation results 
Dependent variable (columns 1-4): Exit of leader in year t     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation LPM Logit Cox proportional hazard 
model 
  Coefficients Odds ratios Hazard ratios 
GDP per capita growtht-1 -0.003*** -0.002** 0.973*** 0.974** 0.976*** 0.983** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) 
Log GDP per capitat-2  -0.004  0.856  0.951 
  (0.034)  (0.367)  (0.252) 
Tenure of leader in power at start of yeart 
(years) 
 -0.001  0.996  1.725 
 (0.001)  (0.014)  (0.773) 
Age of leader in power at start of yeart (years)  0.003***  1.029***  1.015*** 
 (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
Transition dummyt  0.310**  4.272*  1.827* 
  (0.135)  (3.230)  (0.605) 
Democracy dummyt-1  0.018  1.226  1.038 
  (0.024)  (0.280)  (0.152) 
Election dummyt  0.250***  6.881***  3.309*** 
  (0.021)  (0.896)  (0.335) 
Election dummyt-1  0.019  1.181  1.204* 
  (0.012)  (0.159)  (0.115) 
Term limit dummyt  0.769***  +  6.030*** 
    (0.029)   ***   (1.080) 
Country and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.017 0.246 0.025 0.273 - - 
Observations 5,496 5,496 5,082 5,082 5,496 5,496 
LPM estimate on GDP per capita growtht-1  
for logit sample 
- - -0.003*** -0.002** - - 
Years of at least one leader exit 891 891 846 846 880 880 
Countries 162 162 141 141 162 162 
Years: 1962-2006         
Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The logit estimation sample is by necessity restricted to
countries that experienced within-sample variation in the dependent variable. The estimated odds ratio for the term limit
dummy in the logit specification is large, positive, and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Estimates in
columns 2, 4, and 6 control for the secondary school enrollment rate (% gross) and the share of the population aged 65
years and above in year t-2. The hazard model models the years to leader change, treats each leader-spell as an individual 
subject, and only includes leaders in power at the start of the calendar year. The hazard estimates include 11 fewer leader
exits than the LPM estimates because instances of leader exits occurring within the same year as but subsequent to the
natural death of the initial leader are coded as zero (they are coded as one for the other estimates). The R2 terms reflect the 
explanatory power of the time-varying explanatory variables and year dummies. The R2 in columns 1-2 is the within-R2. 
The R2 in columns 3-4 is the pseudo-R2. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.  
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 Logit results are presented as odds ratios in columns 3-4 of Table 2. An 
odds ratio of 1 indicates that a conditional increase in the independent variable is 
not associated with any change in the dependent variable, while an odds ratio 
above 1 indicates that an increase in the independent variable raises the dependent 
variable. The odds ratio on GDP per capita growth is 0.97 in the logit estimates 
(significant at the 5% level and higher), indicating that a percentage point increase 
in the growth rate lowers the probability of leader change by 3%. There is at least 
one leader exit in 16.6% of years in the logit sample so, at the mean, a 3% drop in 
the probability of leader change is equivalent to a 0.4 percentage point reduction 
(i.e. from 16.6% to 16.2%). This suggests that the logit estimates are slightly 
larger than the linear estimates. Estimated hazard ratios from the Cox proportional 
hazard model (columns 5-6 of Table 2) identify a negative impact of economic 
growth on the likelihood of a leader exit in the next year, with a magnitude 
inbetween those obtained from the LPM and logit estimates.11 
Results on the control variables indicate that a strong ageing effect exists: 
older leaders are statistically more likely to lose their jobs (even after controlling 
for tenure). All else equal, leaders of transition economies were more likely to 
lose office during 1989-1992. Unsurprisingly, leaders are more likely to lose 
office subsequent to elections, and upon reaching their term limit. Democracy also 
increases the likelihood of leader turnover, although this effect is reduced by the 
election and term limit dummies. (See section 5.4 for further evidence on the 
impact of democracy on leader exits.)  
 
5.2 Instrumental variable results 
LPM, logit, and hazard model results may suffer from bias due to endogeneity of 
economic growth. Prior to presenting the IV results, it is useful to examine the 
direct impact of the instruments on leader exits. These can be seen in Table 3, 
which presents reduced-form estimations controlling for (1) country and year 
fixed effects and (2) these fixed effects and the set of time-varying controls. The 
results suggest that higher commodity export prices and faster export-partner 
economic growth reduce the likelihood of a leader losing his or her job in the next 
year. The estimations provide no statistically significant evidence of any effect of 
the weather variables on the probability of a leader exiting office. 
 
                                                 
11 Similar results are obtained for exponential, Weibull, or Gompertz survival models. 
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 Table 3. Reduced-form results 
Dependent variable: Exit of leader in year t   
  (1) (2) 
  With no time- 
varying controls 
With time-varying 
controls 
Commodity price instrumentt-1/100 -0.248** -0.221** 
 (0.107) (0.092) 
Export partner growth instrumentt-1/100 -0.014* -0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Precipitation instrumentt-1/100 -0.429 -2.270 
 (2.414) (1.927) 
Temperature instrumentt-1/100 -0.529 -1.524 
 (1.412) (1.322) 
Temperature instrumentt-1*Cold country dummy/100 -0.652 0.625 
  (2.005) (1.975) 
Country and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2 0.016 0.246 
Observations 5,496 5,496 
Years of at least one leader exit  891 891 
Countries 162 162 
Years: 1962-2006     
Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The instruments have been
divided by 100 to reduce the number of decimal places. Estimates in column 2 include the full
set of controls used in the estimate in column 2 of Table 2 (estimated coefficients not shown).
The R2 is the within-R2 and reflects the explanatory power of the time-varying variables and year
dummies. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%.  
 
IV estimates of equation 1 without the time-varying country controls are 
shown in Table 4. IV estimates use each of the instruments separately (columns 3-
6), and consider the instruments jointly (column 2). They use the Fuller 1 
estimator (Fuller 1977), which is a bias-corrected version of the limited 
information maximum likelihood estimator, and provides the most unbiased 
estimates for inference purposes when instruments are potentially weak (Stock 
and Yogo 2005). (Two-stage least squares estimates are similar.) Partial R-
squared and F statistics on the excluded instruments are presented. The F statistic 
on the excluded instruments is the Stock-Yogo weak instruments test statistic. 5% 
significance level critical values for Stock-Yogo tests of both 30% and 5% 
maximal Fuller relative bias are also shown.  
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 The instruments, when considered jointly, safely pass the Stock-Yogo 
weak instrument test, and explain 3.1% of the variation in GDP per capita growth 
for the sample (after country and year fixed effects are controlled for). The 
strongest of the instruments is the export partner growth instrument, which passes 
the Stock-Yogo weak instrument test. While the other instruments do not obtain 
high individual strength for the global sample, they are more important 
explanators of economic growth in additional specifications explored in the 
robustness analysis (section 5.3). The coefficients on the instruments in the first-
stage regressions are of the expected signs: increases in commodity prices, export 
partner GDP growth rates, and precipitation on average result in faster economic 
growth, whereas higher temperatures are on average bad for growth in all but the 
group of cold countries. Tests of endogeneity and overidentification using the full 
set of instruments suggest that economic growth is indeed not exogenous and 
provide no evidence that the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid can be 
rejected. 
Using all of the instruments (column 2 of Table 4), an estimate of the 
impact of growth on leader change that is more than three times larger than the 
LPM result (column 1 of Table 4) is obtained. The estimate indicates that an 
additional percentage point of per capita GDP growth reduces the likelihood of a 
change in national leader in the next year by a percentage point. This equals a 6% 
reduction in this likelihood, which is quite a large effect. The IV result implies 
that an additional percentage point of per capita GDP growth has a similar effect 
on the short-run likelihood of a change in national leader as having a leader who 
is three years younger. 
The IV result on per capita GDP growth, significant at the 5% level, is 
driven primarily by the impact of fluctuations in commodity export prices and 
export partner growth rates. The estimated coefficients on growth using the 
commodity price variation and export partner growth instruments in columns 3-4 
of Table 4 are each negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. That 
negative coefficient estimates are obtained instrumenting with either international 
commodity price movements or export partner growth rates provides reassurance 
against the concern that the results are a product of a violation of the exclusion 
restriction in either estimation. Estimates using the weather instruments (columns 
5-6 of Table 4) suggest a negative effect of economic growth on leader exits, but 
one which is not statistically significant.  
In Table 5, additional controls are added to the IV estimates. The results 
on the effect of growth on leader change are similar to those in Table 4 (although 
are slightly weaker in statistical terms), and results on the control variables are 
similar to those in the LPM specification. 
15
Burke: Economic Growth and Political Survival
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
 Table 5. IV estimation results with additional controls 
Dependent variable: Exit of leader in year t   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation LPM IV (F1) IV (F1) IV (F1) IV (F1) IV (F1) 
Instrument/s None All Commodity 
price 
instrumentt-1 
Export 
partner 
growth 
instrumentt-1
Precipitation 
instrumentt-1 
Temperature 
instrumentst-1 
GDP per capita growtht-1 -0.002** -0.008* -0.022* -0.008 -0.015 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.015) (0.011) 
Log GDP per capitat-2 -0.004 -0.020 -0.058 -0.022 -0.039 0.010 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.051) (0.037) (0.052) (0.044) 
Tenure of leader in power at start of  
yeart (years) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age of leader in power at start of  
yeart (years) 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transition dummyt 0.310** 0.268* 0.168 0.263* 0.218 0.347** 
 (0.135) (0.143) (0.178) (0.146) (0.178) (0.148) 
Democracy dummyt-1 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.016 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Election dummyt 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.244*** 0.248*** 0.246*** 0.251*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Election dummyt-1 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.021* 0.018 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Term limit dummyt 0.769*** 0.767*** 0.762*** 0.767*** 0.764*** 0.771*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) 
Country and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage coefficients       
    Commodity price instrumentt-1 - 0.097*** 0.091*** - - - 
    Export partner growth instrumentt-1 - 0.013*** - 0.013*** - - 
    Precipitation instrumentt-1 - 0.946*** - - 1.052*** - 
    Temperature instrumentt-1 - -0.766*** - - - -0.864*** 
    Temperature instrumentt-1* 
     Cold country dummy 
- 1.543*** - - - 1.743*** 
F statistic on excluded instruments - 14.51 7.94 25.54 9.28 8.83 
Stock-Yogo critical value  - 4.03/6.42 12.71/24.09 12.71/24.09 12.71/24.09 7.49/13.46 
Partial R2 on excluded instruments - 0.029 0.002 0.021 0.001 0.006 
Wooldridge endogeneity test p value - 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.41 0.59 
Sargan overidentification test p value - 0.27 - - - - 
Observations 5,496 5,496 5,496 5,496 5,496 5,496 
Years of at least one leader exit  891 891 891 891 891 891 
Countries 162 162 162 162 162 162 
Years: 1962-2006       
Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5% significance 
level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 30% and 5% maximal Fuller relative bias. 
The null of weak instruments is rejected if the F statistic on the excluded instruments exceeds the Stock-Yogo 
critical value/s. Estimates control for the secondary school enrollment rate (% gross) and the share of the 
population aged 65 years and above in year t-2. Results in column 1 are identical to those in column 2 of Table 2. 
The endogeneity and overidentification tests are for two-stage least squares estimates with robust but unclustered 
standard errors. F1 is Fuller 1. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.  
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 There are several potential explanations for why the IV estimates of the 
impact of per capita GDP growth on the likelihood of leader exits are larger (in 
absolute value terms) than the LPM estimates. One is that the political 
implications of changes in export-sector growth rates are indeed particularly large, 
perhaps because political elites are disproportionately involved in export activities. 
Another is that the LPM estimates suffer from attenuation bias due to 
measurement error in the GDP data. A further possibility is that leaders in crisis 
put pressure on their statistical offices to inflate growth figures (i.e. measurement 
error in economic data may be a function of political instability). Finally, it might 
be that in some instances the dismissal of incompetent leaders is foreseen, and that 
this has a positive impact on the economy. 
 
5.3 Robustness analysis 
To further explore the exclusion restriction, Table 6 presents IV specifications in 
which the instruments are used individually and the unused instruments are 
included directly in the second-stage estimations. The results provide no 
indication that the instruments have a direct effect on the likelihood of leader exits 
over and above the effect of economic growth, either individually or jointly. 
Table 7 presents estimates for a specification which controls for leader 
exits in year t-1. Results on the t-1 GDP per capita growth term remain 
statistically significant. Table 7 also includes specifications using data on growth 
in (1) GDP and (2) gross domestic income (GDI), from the Penn World Table 
(Heston et al. 2011). Results are similar. Of particular note is that commodity 
price movements provide very strong first-stage identification for growth in GDI, 
safely passing the strictest Stock-Yogo weak instrument test. Using the full 
instrument set, a percentage point increase in the GDI growth rate is estimated to 
reduce the likelihood of a leader exit in the next year by 0.5 percentage points, an 
impact which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The timing of the effect warrants examination. Table 8 presents IV results 
for GDP per capita growth in years t-2, t, and t+1 in addition to year t-1 (the year 
of focus to this point). The estimates fail to identify a significant impact of same-
year growth on the probability of a leader exit. There is also no evidence that 
growth in year t-2 significantly affects year-t leader exits, or that leaders are 
replaced in anticipation of the state of the economy in year t+1. It is the impact of 
economic growth on the likelihood of next-year leader changes that remains the 
largest in magnitude across the specifications in Table 8. The reduction in the 
probability of a leader losing his or her job as a result of an increase in economic 
growth thus appears to be realized over the subsequent twelve months. 
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 Table 6. Exploring the exclusion restriction 
Dependent variable: Exit of leader in year t     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation IV (F1) IV (F1) IV (F1) IV (F1) 
Instrument/s included in first stage (all /100) Commodity 
price 
instrumentt-1 
Export partner 
growth 
instrumentt-1 
Precipitation 
instrumentt-1 
Temperature 
instrumentst-1 
GDP per capita growtht-1 -0.023* -0.010* -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.023) (0.016) 
Commodity price instrumentt-1/100  -0.152 -0.203 -0.210 
  (0.129) (0.252) (0.195) 
Export partner growth instrumentt-1/100 0.019  -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.021)  (0.033) (0.023) 
Precipitation instrumentt-1/100 1.588 0.412  0.152 
 (2.575) (2.437)  (2.780) 
Temperature instrumentt-1/100 -2.058 -1.167 -0.820  
 (1.872) (1.463) (2.345)  
Temperature instrumentt-1*Cold country 
dummy/100 
2.253 0.560 -0.093  
(2.925) (2.169) (3.560)   
Country and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p value for joint significance of instruments 
included in second stage only 
0.78 0.62 0.58 0.58 
F statistic on excluded instruments 8.62 30.15 5.92 4.50 
Stock-Yogo critical value  12.71/24.09 12.71/24.09 12.71/24.09 7.49/13.46 
Partial R2 on excluded instruments 0.002 0.024 0.001 0.003 
Observations 5,496 5,496 5,496 5,496 
Years of at least one leader exit 891 891 891 891 
Countries 162 162 162 162 
Years: 1962-2006     
Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The instruments have been divided by 100.
Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5% significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, 
respectively, 30% and 5% maximal Fuller relative bias. The null of weak instruments is rejected if the F 
statistic on the excluded instruments exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value/s. F1 is Fuller 1. * Significant at 
10%. 
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 To allow for the possibility that the effect of t-1 economic growth on 
political survival depends on whether growth is positive or negative, I test 0 1α α=  
in the equation: 
 
  , 1 , 1, 0 1 ,c t c tc t c t c tD G G I Iα α ε− −= + + + +    (2) 
 
where G  equals GDP per capita growth when this is positive (0 otherwise), and 
G  equals GDP per capita growth when this is negative (0 otherwise). (Results 
available on request.) An LPM estimation indicates that 1α  is more negative than 
2α , with the difference significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the impact 
of economic growth on the next-year likelihood of leader exits might be 
asymmetric: i.e. contractions in output have particularly important implications 
for the odds of political survival. The IV estimation provides no statistically 
significant evidence of such asymmetry, however, as the instrumented growth 
terms are estimated with large standard errors. 
The weather variables are relatively weak instruments for economic 
growth in the global sample. Temperature and precipitation are likely to be much 
more important for the economies of poor agricultural countries than they are for 
modern economies (Dell et al. 2008). To allow these instruments to obtain larger 
first-stage identification strength, Table 9 presents IV estimates for the impact of 
economic growth on next-year leader exits for three sub-samples of countries: (1) 
agricultural countries; (2) poor and hot countries, and (3) sub-Saharan African 
countries. Precipitation and temperature are indeed generally much stronger 
instruments for these sub-samples, as identified by the generally larger first-stage 
F statistics on the instrumental variables. The second-stage results across these 
specifications indicate a negative impact of economic growth on the likelihood of 
a leader exit in the next year, although this effect is only statistically significant 
for the case of precipitation shocks to the economies of agricultural countries. 
Altogether, the impact of economic shocks from the weather on political survival 
is not precisely estimated (even when these shocks provide sufficiently strong 
first-stage identification strength). 
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 Many additional robustness checks were carried out (available on request). 
The estimates for t-1 GDP per capita growth are similar and remain statistically 
significant in specifications that control for (country-specific) party dummies. The 
impact of economic growth on the next-year likelihood of political survival 
estimated in column 2 of Table 5 remains statistically significant in estimations 
that control for additional leader characteristics, such as the leader’s gender, 
whether the leader entered office legally, whether the leader served earlier terms 
in office, and whether the leader was the first leader of their country post-
independence. Results are also similar in specifications that control for the 
inflation rate, the percentage of the population under 15 years of age, the 
urbanization rate, the infant mortality rate, the logged size of the population, 
exports as a share of GDP, the number of anti-government demonstrations (from 
Databanks International 2008), internal armed conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002), 
and whether a country is subject to economic sanctions (Marinov 2005). The Arab 
Spring of 2011 suggests that regional political change contagion effects might be 
important to consider. The estimated impact of economic growth on the odds of 
leader change remains similar if the share of other countries in the region 
experiencing leadership change in year t is controlled for.12 
Similar results are obtained using aggregate rather than per capita GDP 
growth. Results are also similar if a dependent variable measuring the number of 
changes in national leader is used (instead of the dummy for leader change). 
Overall results are not affected by using a dependent variable coded as zero for 
instances of leader exit due to sickness, or if data on national leaders from 
Cheibub et al. (2010) or Databanks International (2008) are used to code the 
dependent variable. 
An issue of concern is that the commodity price and export partner growth 
instruments may be affected by political developments in large countries or 
important commodity producers. Nevertheless, IV results are similar if the 20 
largest economies in 1995 (which together accounted for 85% of global GDP in 
US dollar terms) are excluded from the sample. Results are also similar if 
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries are excluded 
or if exports of commodities for which a country contributed more than 15% of 
global exports in 1995 are excluded from that country’s commodity export bundle. 
To explore whether the IV results are sensitive to the choice of 1995 as 
weight year for the commodity export price and export partner growth 
instruments, I carried out additional IV regressions using an instrument weight 
year of 1975. The results are generally similar, although estimation sample sizes 
are smaller and estimated coefficients have lower statistical significance. The IV 
result using a 1975-weighted commodity export price instrument indicates that 
                                                 
12 The seven World Bank (2011a) regions were used in the construction of this variable. 
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 economic growth has a negative impact on next-year leader exits (significant at 
the 10% level). A 1975-weighted export partner growth instrument provides an 
estimate on t-1 growth which is similar to that using 1995 weights, but which is 
not statistically significant.13  
 
5.4 The roles of institutions and development level 
The importance of economic growth for the political survival of national leaders 
may differ for countries with different governance institutions. Table 10 presents 
LPM and IV estimates in which t-1 economic growth per capita is interacted with 
two measures of democracy in t-1: the Cheibub et al. (2010) binary democracy 
indicator, and the Marshall et al. (2010) POLITY2 measure (which I have rescaled 
to range from -1 [full autocracy] to +1 [full democracy] to aid coefficient 
interpretation). 14  Given that the commodity price and export partner growth 
instruments have the most important impact on political survival, IV estimates are 
also provided using these “external economy” instruments. The implied growth 
coefficients for full democracies and full autocracies are shown. 
 The LPM estimates in Table 10 provide no evidence that the short-run 
impact of economic growth on political survival differs between democracies and 
autocracies. Interestingly, the IV estimates suggest that the impact of the growth 
rate on next-year leader exit odds is smaller in democracies than autocracies, 
although the difference is only significant in the estimate in column 2 (and only at 
the 10% level). The IV estimates in columns 3 and 5-6 indicate that the short-run 
impact of growth on leader exits remains negative in democracies, albeit smaller 
(in absolute value terms) than that for autocracies. 
The estimates in Table 10 provide strong evidence that an additional 
percentage point of GDP per capita growth reduces the likelihood of incumbent 
autocrats exiting office in the next year (significant at the 5% level and higher). 
As far as I am aware, this is the first estimate of the importance of economic 
growth for the political survival of leaders in autocratic countries.  
                                                 
13 The significant IV result using the export partner growth instrument is not solely a product of 
using 1995 weights. A similar result is obtained using 2000 weights. 
14 Results using the binary democracy measure of Boix et al. (forthcoming) are similar to those 
using the Cheibub et al. measure. 
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 That (instrumented) growth might be more important for the short-run 
political survival of autocrats than of democrats is surprising, and could be 
attributable to two factors. First, sub-sample estimations (available on request) 
indicate that the instruments are more strongly correlated with economic growth 
in autocracies. As a result, the estimates in Table 10 could reflect a stronger 
LATE arising from external economy and weather shocks in autocracies than in 
democracies. Second, the impact of economic growth on the odds of a leader exit 
in the next year in democracies might be reduced by the rigidity of leader 
replacement timings in some democratic systems (e.g. those with fixed terms). 
That the political survival odds of autocrats are affected by the economy 
relates to the argument of Londregan and Poole (1996) that even autocratic 
countries generally have in-built accountability criteria for leaders which make 
them more likely to be replaced if they perform poorly.15 Slow growth also likely 
provides an opportune time for opponents to grab power off an autocrat. 
My overall interpretation of the results in Table 10 is that, although 
imprecisely estimated, economic growth likely has a negative effect on the odds 
of a next-year leader exit in democracies. Such a conclusion is supported by the 
statistical insignificance of the interaction terms (other than that in column 2), and 
the implied growth coefficients for full democracies, which are -0.003 to -0.007 in 
the POLITY2 IV interaction specifications. That growth reduces the likelihood of 
a democrat exit is also supported by an IV estimation for the democracy sub-
sample (available on request), which indicates that a percentage point increase in 
growth reduces the likelihood of a democrat’s exit in the next year by 1.1 
percentage points. This estimate is similar to the overall effect for the full sample 
(Table 4), although remains outside standard statistical significance (p = 0.27).  
To explore whether the impact of economic growth on political survival 
varies by development level, Table 11 presents estimates for specifications with 
interaction terms between the economic growth rate in t-1 and either (1) the t-2 
log GDP per capita level or (2) a dummy variable for “poor” countries, defined as 
countries with below-median per capita GDP in their first year in the sample 
(following an approach similar to that of Dell et al. 2008). The estimates in 
columns 1-2 provide some indication that higher per capita GDP makes leaders 
less sensitive to short-run economic growth (significant at the 10% level). But 
most of the coefficient estimates in Table 11 have high standard errors, and they 
together provide little evidence that the short-run growth effect varies 
systematically across countries at different development levels. The overall results 
thus suggest that the underlying nature of support coalitions may be broadly 
similar across countries at different levels of economic development as well as 
across countries with different institutions.  
                                                 
15 Londregan and Poole refer to the “underlying similarity of support coalitions” in autocracies and 
democracies (p. 27). 
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 5.5 Economic growth and modes of leader exits 
To explore what types of leader exits are affected most strongly by economic 
growth, I categorize leader exits by mode using the EXIT variable in Archigos. 
Regular exits occur when a leader leaves office according to the prevailing rules, 
provisions, conventions and norms of the country, for reasons including loss of an 
election, end of term, voluntary retirement, losing cabinet support, losing the 
support of parliament, or ill health. 16  Irregular exits occur when a leader is 
removed from office in contravention of rules and conventions (for example, by 
coups, assassinations, military power struggles, or removal by domestic rebel 
forces or revolts). In 719 of the 891 years of leader exits, the first exit during the 
year was for regular reasons. The other 172 exits in the sample were irregular. 
Regular exits make up the majority of the first leader exits in the year in both 
democracies (91%) and autocracies (58%). 
LPM, multinomial logit, and IV results for the two different modes of 
leader exit are presented in Table 12. The results in columns 1-3 indicate that 
faster economic growth reduces the short-run likelihood of a regular leader exit, 
with the IV result suggesting that each percentage point of growth reduces the 
likelihood of a regular exit in the subsequent year by 0.8 percentage points.  
The LPM and multinomial results in columns 4-5 of Table 12 indicate that 
growth tends to be slower in the lead-up to irregular leader exits, yet this may 
reflect reverse causality. The IV estimate in column 6 suggests a negative effect of 
growth on irregular exits, although one that is outside the standard significance 
level. Unreported specifications in which growth is interacted with the democracy 
variable do not indicate that the overall impact of growth on irregular leader exits 
differs between democracies and autocracies.  
Separate (unreported) estimates instrumenting only with precipitation 
suggest slower growth caused by low rainfall increases the short-run likelihood of 
an irregular leader exit, particularly in autocratic countries (significant at the 1% 
level for an autocracy sub-sample, and at 10% for the full sample). 17  A 
statistically significant estimate [-0.003] of the impact of growth on irregular 
leader exits is also obtained using the full instrument set and the Heston et al. 
GDP growth data. There is thus some evidence that irregular leader transitions are 
affected by growth shocks (especially those from precipitation), although the 
overall average effect of growth on the likelihood of irregular leader exits appears 
to be small. 
 
                                                 
16 Leaders exiting due to ill health have been added to the Archigos coding of regular exits. 
17 This result relates to the finding that falls in precipitation often trigger autocratic countries to 
transition toward democracy (Burke and Leigh 2010, Brückner and Ciccone 2011). 
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 5.6 Leader reactions to growth shocks 
National leaders differ substantially in their political longevity. Some, such as 
President Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire (in office 1965-1997), have 
stayed in power for long periods of time, despite poor economic records. One 
potential factor in explaining the longevity of these leaders is that they employ 
oppressive tactics to circumvent rising political opposition at times of weak 
economic growth. There is little evidence on whether national leaders are more 
likely to engage in crackdowns on opponents when the economy is weak.18 
To explore the impact of growth on political oppression, I utilize data from 
Databanks International (2008) on “purges”, defined as any systematic 
elimination by jailing or execution of opponents within the ranks of the regime or 
the opposition. I regress a dummy for whether a country had a political purge on 
economic growth and year dummies in the fixed-effects LPM and IV model 
frameworks. The Databanks International data are constructed primarily from 
reports in the New York Times. They may be subject to geographic and other 
biases, but provide the best available data coverage for these variables.  
The results on the impact of economic growth (both current and lagged) on 
purges are presented in Table 13. The LPM estimate in column 1 indicates that 
political purges tend to occur during years of slower growth. The IV estimates 
indicate a negative impact of growth on the likelihood of purges, yet these 
estimates are imprecise (and do not pass the standard statistical significance 
criteria). Accordingly, the results do not provide strong evidence on whether slow 
growth increases the likelihood of oppression. I also did not find strong evidence 
of a causal impact of economic growth on purges in unreported specifications 
using the instruments individually and/or using the Heston et al. GDP growth 
data. Whether and how leaders respond to negative economic shocks to attempt to 
improve their likelihood of remaining in office may be a fruitful line for further 
research. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Henderson (1991) reports that stronger long-run economic growth reduces political repression, 
but does not look at the importance of the economic growth rate for political repression in the 
short term. 
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 Table 13. Economic growth and the likelihood of political purges 
Dependent variable: Purge dummyt   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation LPM IV (F1) LPM IV (F1) 
Excluded instrument/s None Allt None Allt-1 
GDP per capita growtht -0.001** -0.003   
 (0.001) (0.003)   
GDP per capita growtht-1   0.000 -0.003 
      (0.001) (0.003) 
Country and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F statistic on excluded instruments - 11.92 - 13.26 
Stock-Yogo critical value  - 4.03/6.42 - 4.03/6.42 
Partial R2 on excluded instruments - 0.028 - 0.033 
Observations 5,410 5,410 5,415 5,415 
Years of one or more purge 251 251 251 251 
Countries 162 162 162 162 
Years: 1962-2006     
Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The set of
instruments includes the commodity price instrument, export partner growth
instrument, precipitation instrument, and temperature instruments. Stock-Yogo
critical values are the 5% significance level critical values for weak instruments
tests based on, respectively, 30% and 5% maximal Fuller relative bias. The null
of weak instruments is rejected if the F statistic on the excluded instruments
exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value/s. A purge is any systematic elimination
by jailing or execution of political opponents within the ranks of the regime or
the opposition. F1 is Fuller 1. ** Significant at 5%.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper explores whether a nation’s rate of economic growth affects the short-
run political survival prospects of that nation’s leader. The identification strategy 
exploits variation in economic growth due to shocks from the global economy and 
the weather to obtain an internally-valid estimate of the effect of economic growth 
on the likelihood of leader exits. The results provide evidence that faster 
economic growth increases the likelihood that national leaders will retain their 
positions. Shocks from the global economy (commodity prices and export partner 
incomes) have a particularly important effect on the ability of national leaders to 
remain in office. While growth slowdowns do not invariably result in leadership 
change, the findings suggest that hard economic times make national leaders more 
likely to lose their jobs, particularly via regular means such as resignations and 
election losses. That the state of the economy has a systematic effect on the 
likelihood of leader survival provides evidence of a broad economic political 
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 cycle (with causality from the economy to politics) that mirrors the much-studied 
political business cycle (which results from leaders’ actions to manipulate the 
economic cycle to maximize their chances of retaining office).  
Existing studies have typically examined the effect of economic growth on 
democratic election results, and have normally ignored the potential endogeneity 
of economic growth. This paper provides causal evidence of a relationship 
between economic growth and political survival that extends beyond the ballot 
box. Of most interest is the finding that even leaders in autocratic countries are 
more likely to lose their positions when the economy is weak.  
The magnitude of the estimated impact of GDP growth on political 
survival is quite large. The IV estimate in column 2 of Table 5 indicates that a 
standard deviation increase in the rate of economic growth reduces the probability 
of leader change in the next year by almost 5 percentage points. This is equal to 
29% of the underlying probability of leader change.  
The results speak to the importance of economic fortunes for the political 
longevity of national leaders. Shocks to the economy from commodity prices and 
external demand for exports are outside the control of individual leaders, but 
affect the probability that they will keep their jobs. The evidence indicates that 
many leaders who have served short terms may be able to cite bad luck. Similarly, 
many long-lasting leaders may have fortuitous economic times to thank.  
The IV finding that stronger GDP growth caused by exogenous factors 
(e.g. increasing prices for commodity exports) improves political survival 
prospects does not necessarily imply that stronger GDP growth caused by leader 
policies also improves political survival prospects. Unfortunately, I do not have an 
identification strategy to obtain an internally-valid estimate of the effect of leader-
affected changes in economic growth on the likelihood of that leader’s political 
survival. Reason would suggest, however, that if at least some of the impact of a 
leader’s actions on the economy is measurable by at least some members of the 
selectorate, the leader should be held more accountable for these outcomes than 
outcomes over which he/she has no control. If this is the case, the IV estimates 
may represent the lower bound of the impact of leader-affected economic growth 
on that leader’s short-run political survival prospects. 
The findings have important policy implications. They suggest that 
national leaders should not neglect the economy, for the sake of their own careers 
at least. Leaders in countries with flexible election terms are well advised to time 
elections for when the economy is strong so as to maximise their likelihood of re-
election. Another implication is that government interventions to bolster economic 
growth, where effective, have positive externalities for incumbent national leaders 
of trade-linked partners, including autocratic leaders. Finally, economic 
slowdowns place external actors in a unique position to influence political change. 
Crisis assistance conditioned on the benevolence of national leaders may be 
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 valuable in shoring up the positions of benevolent leaders during times of 
economic hardship, while ensuring that corrupt or autocratic leaders do not 
receive relief from domestic political pressures at the very moment when these 
pressures are building in strength. 
 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
Exit of leader in year: Binary variable, =1 if there are one or more exits of the 
effective primary national leader during the year for reasons other than 
natural death or foreign deposition; 0 otherwise. Goemans et al. (2009). 
Extended to cover 2005 and 2006 using Rulers.org (2011). 
 
GDP per capita growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based 
on constant local currency. Scaled so that one percentage point of growth is 
1, not 0.01. World Bank (2011a).  
 
Log GDP per capita: Log GDP per capita based on constant 2000 GDP in United 
States dollars (US$). World Bank (2011a). 
 
Secondary enrollment rate (% gross): Number of pupils enrolled in secondary 
education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in 
the theoretical age group for secondary education. Data from the World 
Bank (2011b) and DRI (2009). Data are interpolated (linear) and 
extrapolated (constant).  
 
Population aged 65 years and above (%): Percentage of the total population aged 
65 years or older. World Bank (2011a). 
 
Tenure of leader in power at start of year (years): Sum of 31 Decembers that the 
leader has been in office during current tenure. Calculated for leader in 
office on 1 January using Goemans et al. (2009). Extended to cover 2005 
and 2006 using Rulers.org (2011). 
 
Age of leader in power at start of year (years): Calendar year minus birth year of 
leader in office on 1 January, calculated using Goemans et al. (2009). 
Extended to cover 2005 and 2006 using Rulers.org (2011).  
 
Transition dummy: Binary variable, =1 for the years 1989-1992 for transition 
economies; 0 otherwise. DRI (2009). 
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 Democracy dummy: Binary variable, =1 if country is classed as a democracy at 
year end; 0 otherwise. Cheibub et al. (2010). Data are unavailable for 1% of 
country-years in the sample. Countries are coded as autocracies for these 
years (an operation that does not affect the results). 
 
Election dummy: Binary variable, =1 if an election affecting the effective national 
leader occurred during the year; 0 otherwise. Constructed with election data 
from Goemans (2009) using the following operation on six binary 
variables: Presidential election (0,1)*Leader subject to presidential elections 
(0,1) + Parliamentary election (0,1)*Leader subject to parliamentary 
elections (0,1) + Presidential or parliamentary election (0,1)*Assembly-
elected president (0,1). Beck et al. (2001) and other sources used to allocate 
leaders to elections. 
 
Term limit dummy: Binary variable, =1 if national leader left office due to legal 
requirement during year; 0 otherwise. Author construction. Does not 
include cases in which a national leader avoided a requirement to leave 
office. 
 
GDP per capita growth (Penn World Table): Annual percentage growth rate of 
GDP per capita based on constant-price purchasing power parity-converted 
GDP (chain series). Scaled so that one percentage point of growth is 1, not 
0.01. Heston et al. (2011).  
 
GDI per capita growth (Penn World Table): Annual percentage growth rate of 
real gross domestic income per capita. GDI is constructed via terms-of-
trade adjustments to constant-price purchasing power parity-converted GDP 
(Laspeyres). Scaled so that one percentage point of growth is 1, not 0.01. 
Heston et al. (2011). 
 
POLITY2 (rescaled): Revised Combined Polity Score of the Polity IV Project. 
Marshall et al. (2010). Rescaled so it ranges from -1 (full autocracy) to +1 
(full democracy). 
 
Purge dummy: Binary variable, =1 if there is an instance of systematic elimination 
by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime 
or the opposition. Databanks International (2008). 
 
Commodity price instrument: Differenced logarithm of a country-specific 
commodity export price index for 50 commodities, using 1995 commodity 
34
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 5
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
 export basket weights and interacted with the 1995 share of exports of the 
50 commodities in GDP. Burke and Leigh (2010). 
 
Export partner growth instrument: Weighted average of export partners’ GDP 
growth rates multiplied by the 1995 share of exports in GDP (capped at 
100% of GDP). Data for 1995 are used for export partner weights. 
Constructed using World Bank (2011a) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 2009) data. In the case of missing export partner GDP growth data, 
data from Heston et al. (2011) are used. If export partner GDP data are still 
missing, the world GDP growth rate is used. Similar results are obtained 
using alternative approaches to dealing with missing export partner growth 
data. For five countries, data on the export share of GDP for 1995 are not 
available. Data available for the year closest to 1995 are used. For three 
countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, South Africa), data on exports by partner 
for 1995 are not available from the IMF; data for 1998 are used. For six 
countries, data on exports by partner are not available for any year. For the 
four small members of the Southern Africa Customs Union, the export 
partner weight is set equal to 1 for South Africa and 0 for other partners. 
For Bhutan and Eritrea, the export weight is set equal to 1 for the largest 
export market as listed by the Central Intelligence Agency (2009). Results 
are similar if these countries are excluded from the estimations.  
 
Precipitation instrument: Natural logarithm of yearly precipitation in millimeters 
(mm). Data are country averages using 1990 within-country population 
weights from Dell et al. (2008). Data for five small countries (Bahrain, 
Barbados, Singapore, Maldives, Malta) are not available from Dell et al. 
(2008); data from Mitchell et al. (2004) are used. The Mitchell et al. data 
are not population weighted. 
 
Temperature instruments: (1) Temperature (ºC); and (2) temperature (ºC) 
multiplied by a dummy for countries with an average temperature for the 
period 1960-1970 of less than 12ºC. Data are country averages using 1990 
within-country population weights from Dell et al. (2008). Data for Bahrain, 
Barbados, Singapore, Maldives, and Malta are not available from Dell et al. 
(2008); data from Mitchell et al. (2004) are used (which are not population-
weighted). The 1960-1970 temperature average is from Mitchell et al. 
(2004). 
 
35
Burke: Economic Growth and Political Survival
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
 References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A. and Yared P. (2008). ‘Income and 
democracy’, American Economic Review, 98, 808–842. 
 
Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N. and Swagel, P. (1996). ‘Political instability and 
economic growth’, Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 189–211. 
 
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. and Cohen, G.D. (1997). Political Cycles and the 
Macroeconomy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Arora, V. and Vamvakidis, A. (2005). ‘How much do trading partners matter for 
economic growth?’, IMF Staff Papers, 52, 24–40.  
 
Barro, R.J. (1991). ‘Economic growth in a cross section of countries’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 106, 407–443. 
 
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. (2001). ‘New tools in 
comparative political economy: The database of political institutions’, 
World Bank Economic Review, 15, 165–176. 
 
Besley, T. and Kudamatsu, M. (2008). ‘Making autocracy work’, in E. Helpman 
(ed.) Institutions and Economic Performance, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Bienen, H. and van de Walle, N. (1992). ‘A proportional hazard model of 
leadership duration’, Journal of Politics, 54, 685–717. 
 
Bienen, H.S. and van de Walle, N. (1991). Of Time and Power: Leadership 
Duration in the Modern World, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. 
 
Boix, C., Miller, M. and Rosato, S. (Forthcoming). ‘A complete dataset of 
political regimes, 1800-2007’, Comparative Political Studies.  
 
Brender, A. and Drazen, A. (2008). ‘How do budget deficits and economic growth 
affect reelection prospects? Evidence from a large panel of countries’, 
American Economic Review, 98, 2203–2220. 
 
Brückner, M. and Ciccone, A. (2010). ‘International commodity prices, growth 
and the outbreak of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa’, Economic Journal, 
120, 519–534. 
36
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 5
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
  
Brückner, M. and Ciccone, A. (2011). ‘Rain and the democratic window of 
opportunity’, Econometrica, 79, 923–947. 
 
Brückner, M., Ciccone, A., and Tesei, A. (Forthcoming). ‘Oil price shocks, 
income, and democracy’, Review of Economics and Statistics. 
 
Brunetti, A. (1997). Politics and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Data 
Perspective, Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris.  
  
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R.M. and Morrow, J.D. (2003). The 
Logic of Political Survival, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Smith, A. (2010). ‘Leader survival, revolutions, and 
the nature of government finance’, American Journal of Political Science, 
54, 936–950. 
 
Burke, P.J. and Leigh, A. (2010). ‘Do output contractions trigger democratic 
change?’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 124–157. 
 
Cáceres, N. and Malone, S. (2011). ‘Economic growth, political institutions, and 
leadership transitions’, mimeo. University of the Andes School of 
Management. 
 
Carmignani, F. (2002). ‘New evidence on the politics and economics of 
multiparty cabinets duration’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 49, 
249–279. 
 
Caselli, F. and Tesei, A. (2011). ‘Resource windfalls, political regimes, and 
political stability’, CEPR Discussion Paper 8662. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency (2009). The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.  
 
Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J.R. (2010). ‘Democracy and dictatorship 
revisited’, Public Choice, 143, 67–101. 
 
Ciccone, A. (2011). ‘Economic shocks and civil conflict: A comment’, American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 215–227 
 
37
Burke: Economic Growth and Political Survival
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
 Cox, D. (1972). ‘Regression models and life tables’, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series B, 34, 187–220. 
 
Databanks International (2008). Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, 
http://www.databanksinternational.com.  
 
Deaton, A.S. and Miller, R.I. (1995). ‘International commodity prices, 
macroeconomic performance, and politics in sub-Saharan Africa’, 
Princeton Studies in International Finance, 79. 
 
Dell, M., Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. (2008). ‘Climate change and economic 
growth: Evidence from the last half century’, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 14132. 
 
Development Research Institute (2009). Global Development Network Growth 
Database, http://nyudri.org/resources/global-development-network-growth-
database/.  
 
Drazen, A. (2000). ‘The political business cycle after 25 years’, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, 15, 75–117. 
 
Fuller, W.A. (1977). ‘Some properties of a modification of the limited 
information estimator’, Econometrica, 45, 939–953. 
 
Gleditsch, N.P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M. and Strand, H. 
(2002). ‘Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 39, 615–637. 
 
Goemans, H.E. (2009). Election Dates, 
http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm.  
 
Goemans, H.E., Gleditsch, K.S. and Chiozza, G. (2009). ‘Introducing Archigos: A 
dataset of political leaders’, Journal of Peace Research, 46, 269–283. 
 
Greene, W.H. (2000). Econometric Analysis, 4th ed., Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ. 
 
Henderson, C.W. (1991). ‘Conditions affecting the use of political repression’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35, 120–142. 
 
38
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 5
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
 Heston, A. (1994). ‘A brief review of some problems in using national accounts 
data in level of output comparisons and growth studies’, Journal of 
Development Economics, 44, 29–52. 
 
Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2011). Penn World Table Version 7. 
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Hsiang, S.M. (2010). ‘Temperatures and cyclones strongly associated with 
economic production in the Caribbean and Central America’, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 15367–15372. 
 
Huntington, S.P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, CT. 
 
Huntington, S.P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK. 
 
Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H. and Shin, Y. (2003). ‘Testing for unit roots in 
heterogeneous panels’, Journal of Econometrics 115, 53–74. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2009). Direction of Trade Statistics, 
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm.  
 
Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. (2005). ‘Do leaders matter? National leadership and 
growth since World War II’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 835–
864. 
 
Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. (2009). ‘Hit or miss? The effect of assassinations on 
institutions and war’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1, 
55–87. 
 
Leigh, A. (2009). ‘Does the world economy swing national elections?’, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 71, 163–181. 
 
Li, H. and Zhou, L.-A. (2005). ‘Political turnover and economic performance: The 
incentive role of personnel control in China’, Journal of Public Economics, 
89, 1743–1762. 
 
Lindenberg, M. (1990). ‘World economic cycles and Central American political 
instability’, World Politics, 42, 397–421. 
 
39
Burke: Economic Growth and Political Survival
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
 Londregan, J., Bienen, H. and van de Walle, N. (1995). ‘Ethnicity and leadership 
succession in Africa’, International Studies Quarterly, 39, 1–25. 
 
Londregan, J.B. and Poole, K.T. (1990). ‘Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure 
of executive power’, World Politics, 42, 151–183. 
 
Londregan, J.B. and Poole, K.T. (1996). ‘Does high income promote democracy?’ 
World Politics, 49, 1–30. 
 
Malone, S.W. (2011). ‘Sovereign indebtedness, default, and gambling for 
redemption’, Oxford Economic Papers, 63, 331–354. 
 
Marinov, N. (2005). ‘Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders?’, 
American Journal of Political Science, 49, 564–576. 
 
Marshall, M.G., Jaggers, K. and Gurr, T.R. (2010). Polity IV Project: Political 
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity.htm. 
 
Matsuura, K. and Willmott, C. (2007). Terrestrial Air Temperature and 
Precipitation: 1900-2006 Gridded Monthly Time Series, Version 1.01, 
University of Delaware, http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~climate/.  
 
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. (2004). ‘Economic shocks and civil 
conflict: An instrumental variables approach’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 112, 725–753. 
 
Mitchell, T.D., Carter, T.R., Jones, P.D., Hulme, M. and New, M. (2004). ‘A 
comprehensive set of high-resolution grids of monthly climate for Europe 
and the globe: The observed record (1901–2000) and 16 scenarios (2001–
2100)’, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 55. 
 
Olson, M. Jr. (1963). ‘Rapid growth as a destabilizing force’, Journal of 
Economic History, 23, 529–552. 
 
Palmer, H.D. and Whitten, G.D. (1999). ‘The electoral impact of unexpected 
inflation and economic growth’, British Journal of Political Science, 29, 
623–639. 
 
Pritchett, L. and Summers, L.H. (1996). ‘Wealthier is healthier’, Journal of 
Human Resources, 31, 841–868.  
40
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 5
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
  
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy 
and Development: Political Institutions and the Well-Being of the World, 
1950–1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.  
 
Remmer, K.L. (1991). ‘The political impact of economic crisis in Latin America 
in the 1980s’, American Political Science Review, 85, 777–800. 
 
Rulers.org (2011). Rulers, http://rulers.org/.  
 
Stock, J.H. and Yogo, M. (2005). ‘Testing for weak instruments in linear IV 
regression’, in D.W.K. Andrews and J.H. Stock (eds) Identification and 
Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas 
Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Triesman, D. (2011). ‘Income, democracy, and the cunning of reason’, NBER 
Working Paper 17132. 
 
United Nations (2011). UNdata, http://data.un.org/.  
 
Wolfers, J. (2002). ‘Are voters rational? Evidence from gubernatorial elections’, 
Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1730.  
 
World Bank (2011a). World Development Indicators, 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40.  
 
World Bank (2011b). Education Statistics, 
http://www.worldbank.org/education/edstats.  
 
41
Burke: Economic Growth and Political Survival
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | Australian National University (Australian National University)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 3/21/12 9:50 PM
